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ABSTRACT
We study the implications of hedging for firm financing and investment. We do so using an extensive,
hand-collected dataset on corporate hedging activities. Hedging can lower the odds of negative firm
realizations, reducing the expected costs of financial distress. In theory, this should ease a firm's access
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spreads and are less likely to have capital expenditure restrictions in their loan agreements. These favorable
financing terms, in turn, allow hedgers to invest more. Our tests characterize two exact channels (cost
of borrowing and investment restrictions) through which hedging affects corporate outcomes. The
analysis we present shows that hedging has a first-order effect on firm financing and investment, and
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novel evidence on the real consequences of financial contracting.
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Active corporate risk management would be irrelevant in a Modigliani-Miller world of perfect
capital markets. Yet, risk management through nancial hedging has become increasingly important
in recent years. According to BIS, at the end of December 2009, the notional value of outstanding
interest rate (IR) and foreign exchange (FX) derivatives held by non-nancial customers was $35.6
trillion and $8.8 trillion, respectively. By comparison, at the end of 2000 those numbers were only $6.1
trillion and $3.3 trillion. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) reports that
virtually all of the worlds largest companies use derivatives to hedge their business and nancial risks.
Despite their widespread use, there is limited evidence on the real and nancial implications of
derivatives hedging.1 Starting with Nance et al. (1993), Tufano (1996), and Géczy et al. (1997), most
prior studies investigate variables that explain cross-sectional variation in the use of derivatives by
rms (hedging determinants). More recent papers look at the relation between hedging and corporate
valuation. Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter et al. (2006), for example, nd that hedging is
associated with some 5% to 10% increase in rm value. Other studies, however, report more mixed
results (see Jin and Jorion (2006)). Examining the relation between hedging and rm value is an
intuitive way of gauging the welfare implications of hedging. Estimates of that relation, however, do
not show how hedging a¤ects corporate welfare.
This study identies precise mechanisms through which hedging a¤ects real and nancial corporate
outcomes. It does so by examining the impact of hedging on rms external nancing costs and
investment spending. Theory proposes a straightforward connection between hedging and rms
ability to raise funds: hedging reduces the probability of lower-tail realizations, reducing the expected
costs associated with nancial distress and bankruptcy (Smith and Stulz (1985) and Stulz (1996)).2
In theory, hedging commits rms to meeting obligations in states of the world in which they would fail
(Bessembinder (1991)) and makes it more di¢ cult for managers to engage in risk-shifting (Campbell
and Kracaw (1990)). Both of these e¤ects should improve the contract terms rms obtain from their
lenders, including credit facilities that carry lower interest rates and have fewer investment restrictions.
It is possible, however, for rms to unwind their hedging positions after signing contracts with
their lenders. After loans are granted, for example, managers may buy new instruments that o¤set
their previous positions, or may cancel their hedging programs altogether. Contrary to this notion,
Purnanandam (2008) presents a theory showing that it is optimal for managers facing distress to keep
their hedges after issuing debt. In addition, reputational concerns may prevent rms from deceiving
banks with ex-post changes in their hedging programs. Yet another safeguard against opportunistic
behavior by rms is the use of performance pricing in loan agreements, which allows banks to
increase interest spreads after loans are granted. If hedging programs are often reversed in the post-
1But see Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) for a pioneering paper on the implications of hedging in the gold industry.
2These costs include direct bankruptcy costs (e.g., lawyerscharges and administrative fees) as well as indirect costs
due to the potential loss of customers, suppliers, and growth opportunities (Bris et al. (2006) and Purnanandam (2008)).
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loan period, one should not observe hedgers obtaining better contract terms with their lenders.
To investigate the ultimate e¤ect of hedging on rm outcomes, we use a new, hand-collected
dataset on derivatives contracts. For each rm in our dataset, we also gather detailed information on
private credit agreements. These matched data allow us to identify links between hedging activity,
external nancing costs, and investment restrictions. While we describe the data gathering process
below, it is worth highlighting the key features of our approach. We focus on private credit agree-
ments in the syndicated loan market because this market has become the largest source of corporate
funding in the last two decades.3 Importantly, our investigation requires nely-dened data, and
bank loans contain covenants that are more detailed, comprehensive, and tightly set than other credit
instruments. With these considerations in mind, our data gathering process starts from a sample
of loans collected from various sources. We then hand collect information on borrowersderivatives
usage from their SEC lings. This yields a dataset of over one thousand individual rms for which we
obtain additional information on characteristics, such as size, protability, and investment spending
over several years.
Our evidence suggests that hedging reduces the cost of external nancing and eases the rms
investment process. The results we nd are economically and statistically signicant. For example, a
one-standard deviation increase in hedging intensity (the amount of interest rate and currency hedg-
ing over total assets) is associated with a reduction of about 54 basis points in loan spreads. This is a
signicant number when compared to the average loan spread of 189 basis points (a 29% reduction).
We also estimate that a one-standard deviation increase in hedging intensity reduces by 20% the odds
of having an investment restriction covenant in a loan contract. Our tests further characterize the
direct, positive impact of hedging intensity on investment spending. In all, the estimates we present
are new to the literature and highlight the economic signicance of corporate hedging.
Simultaneity is a source of concern for any study dealing with nancial decision-making, including
corporate risk management. Relative to other studies, this issue is minimized in our tests because
loan spreads and capital expenditure restrictions are set by the rmscreditors and by competitive
forces in the market for loanable funds (i.e., observed outcomes are not rm-choice variables). More-
over, as we discuss below, there is an institutional mismatchbetween providers of loan and hedging
contracts (outcomes and treatment status are not jointly set by the rms creditors). Yet, rms
choose to accept the contracts that are observed by the econometrician. Accordingly, our inferences
could be biased in case rmschoices are confounded with factors that inuence observed outcomes
and that are not accounted for in our baseline model. To alleviate this problem, we need to nd a
variable (or instrument) that is related to rmshedging policies, but that is not directly related to
their creditorsdecisions regarding interest rates and capital expenditure restrictions.
3Syndicated loan issuance grew from approximately $150 billion in 1987 to $1.7 trillion in 2007, surpassing corporate
bond issuance to become the most important corporate nancing channel.
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The literature does not provide much guidance on this estimation issue and we fail to identify
events that could work as surrogates for natural experiments in hedging.However, we identify a
plausible instrumental approach that arises from institutional features of the U.S. tax system. When
their relevant tax schedule is convex, rms can reduce their expected tax liabilities by hedging in
order to minimize income volatility (see, e.g., Smith and Stulz (1985), Graham and Smith (1999),
and Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000)). The convexity of statutory tax rates thus provides rms with
incentives to hedge (inclusion restriction). At the same time, tax convexity per se is unlikely to exert a
direct, rst-order e¤ect on the terms creditors include in their nancing agreements (exclusion restric-
tion).4 With these restrictions in place, we implement an instrumental variablexed e¤ects estimator
that deals with endogeneity by exploiting tax-related non-linearities in the demand for hedging.5
Our baseline results conform to a theory in which hedging eases rm nancing by reducing the
likelihood of states in which costs of nancial distress are high and the rm engages in risk shifting.
Those results, however, may not show direct evidence of these dynamics. To substantiate our infer-
ences, we then examine whether variables that capture the potential for nancial distress and asset
substitution modulate the relation between hedging and loan contracts in tandem with our central
hypothesis.
As a rst check, we include Altmans Z-score and its interaction with hedging in our baseline
model. We would expect Z-score to have a negative impact on loan spreads since riskier rms (those
with lower Z-scores) should be charged higher interest. This is exactly what we nd. More interesting,
however, is the coe¢ cient attracted by the hedgingZ-score interaction term. This term returns a
positive, statistically signicant coe¢ cient, implying a pronounced dampening of the negative asso-
ciation between Z-scores and loan spreads for rms that hedge more.6 Simply put, our estimations
imply that hedging is more valuable for borrowers facing a higher likelihood of nancial distress.
Examining whether asset substitution also changes the relation between hedging and loan spreads
is more challenging. To capture that e¤ect, we use a surrogate proxy that reects a rms investment
growth options; namely, the ratio of market-to-book value of assets (M/B). The premise behind this
strategy is that rms with more growth options should have greater latitude in shifting their invest-
ments towards riskier assets (see related approaches in Johnson (2003) and Eisdorfer (2008)). We
interact that proxy with hedging, similarly to what we do with Z-scores above. Our tests return a
negative coe¢ cient on the hedgingM/B interaction, suggesting that the negative e¤ect of hedging
on loan spreads is greater for rms whose investment opportunity set is likely to allow for greater risk
4Notice that this is an idiosyncratic, time-varying e¤ect that is di¢ cult to measure and price in a loan. At a more
practical level, the loan o¢ cers we consulted say they do not consider subtle tax issues (such as convexity) in their loan
pricing schemes because their claims on rmsincome are gross of taxes.
5We show in Section II.B that identication does not come from rm income level, which would inuence loan
spreads, but from well-identied non-linearities (e.g., kinks) in the tax schedules (after controlling for rm income level).
6As shown below, we reach similar conclusions when we study the interplay between nancial distress and hedging
using a distance-to-defaultproxy.
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taking. In other words, hedging is more valuable for those rms with a higher ability to risk-shift.
Our base tests show that hedging reduces promised, contractual rates in loan contracts. Naturally,
the rms observed loan spread includes a portion compensating investors for the expected default loss
due to idiosyncratic risks and a portion compensating investors for the undiversiable risks of debt.
Accordingly, the observed drop in spreads is a necessary but not a su¢ cient condition for the cost of
capital to be reduced, since it could be caused by a drop in the expected default risk premium, rather
than a drop in the (true) cost of debt. To better understand these e¤ects, we decompose the promised
interest rate into expected default risk premium and true cost of debt, and examine how hedging a¤ects
the true cost of debt. We nd that hedging helps lower the true cost of debt, and the e¤ect of hedging
is stronger in rms that are near distress or that are more likely to engage in risk shifting.
We then turn our attention to the real-side implications of hedging. We do this by looking at
the covenants associated with loan contracts, in particular those explicitly constraining investment.
We nd that hedging signicantly reduces the likelihood of capital expenditure restrictions in loan
agreements. Specically, our tests suggest that the average IR/FX hedger is 20% less likely to have
clauses restricting capital expenditures in its future credit agreements. Similarly, and also in line with
our previous ndings on the cost of borrowing, we nd that hedging alters the link between measures
of rm risk (e.g., Z-scores) and the likelihood of capital expenditure restrictions.
To gain further insight on the hedginginvestment relation, we also examine the direct impact of
hedging on capital spending. Relative to a non-hedger counterfactual, we nd that the average IR/FX
hedger is able to increase investment spending by about 13% of the sample mean level of investment.
We also examine how heterogeneity in rm nancial conditions shapes the relation between hedging
and investment. We nd, for example, that hedging ameliorates the strong, negative relation between
nancial distress risk and investment.
Our paper contributes to various literatures. Our primary contribution to the hedging literature
is to show that hedging has a rst-order e¤ect on rm nancing and investment. To our knowledge,
we are the rst to simultaneously investigate the impact of hedging on the cost of debt, the likelihood
of capital expenditure restrictions, and investment. We show two precise mechanisms  cost of debt
nancing and investment restrictions  through which hedging a¤ects corporate outcomes. Impor-
tantly, our ndings on the negative relation between hedging and loan spreads provide new insights
into how hedging a¤ects corporate wealth. Unlike other papers, we focus on creditorsevaluation of
corporate hedging  prior studies examine hedging from shareholdersperspective. In this regard,
our paper adds to the loan literature by showing that corporate hedging is an important determinant
of loan contract terms. Finally, by explicitly connecting hedging and investment spending, our study
adds to a new line of research on the real implications of nancial contracting (e.g., Almeida et al.
(2009)). This line of inquiry is likely to o¤er important insights about the role of nancial contracting
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in the economy for policymakers and future researchers.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the sample selection
process and construction of the hedging variables. Sections 3 and 4 present our empirical results on the
interplay between hedging, loan spreads, and rm investment. Section 5 presents robustness checks.
Section 6 looks at additional economic costs and benets of hedging. Section 7 concludes the paper.
I Sample Selection and Variable Construction
A Basic Sample Selection
To gauge the impact of hedging on rmsaccess to credit, we need detailed information on contract
terms. Importantly, the nancing instruments examined need to be economically relevant and widely
used by rms. Private loan agreements have become the most important mode of external nancing
by rms in the last two decades and rms report detailed information on the terms governing these
agreements. We begin our sampling with the dataset used in Nini et al. (2009) (hereafter referred to
as the NSS sample), which contains information on various dimensions of loan agreements between
nancial institutions and rms.7 The NSS sample contains unique information on investment restric-
tions in loan covenants. This information enables us to examine whether hedging improves corporate
investment by relaxing capital investment restrictions  evidence hitherto not reported in the litera-
ture. Notably, a sizeable window of the NSS sample coincides with a period in which rules governing
the disclosure of derivatives usage allow for more precise measurement of hedging activities by rms.
For each loan contract in the NSS sample, we collect the borrowers hedging information from the
10-K led in the previous year. This lag is meant to ensure that hedging information can be assumed
to be pre-determined. Our sample starts in 1996, the rst year in the NSS dataset, and ends in 2002,
when FASB SFAS 133 became e¤ective. SFAS 133 requires rms to disclose the fair market valuesof
derivatives contracts (as opposed to the notional values previously required by FASB SFAS 119). Gra-
ham and Rogers (2002), among others, note that compared with notional value information, the fair
value information reported under SFAS 133 reveals only limited information about derivatives usage.
The authors warn against the use of information reported under SFAS 133 in studies on rm hedging.8
B Hedging Variables
B.1 Data Collection Process
We use a web crawler program searching for keywords in every 10-K, 10-KT, 10-K405, 10KSB, and
10KSB40 for each of the 2,288 rm-years of the NSS sample that fall in the 19962002 period. We use
7We thank Amir Su for making these data available in his website.
8SFAS 119 requires rms to disclose detailed derivatives information including the notional values, purpose, nature,
and terms of their derivatives contracts. Some of this information is no longer required under SFAS 133.
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the following keywords to locate information used in our data coding: "derivative", "hedg", "nan-
cial instrument", "swap", "market risk", "expos", "futures", "forward contract", "forward exchange",
"option contract", "risk management", and "notional". When a keyword is found, we read the sur-
rounding text and hand-code the hedging variables. As in prior derivatives studies (e.g., Allayannis
and Weston (2001) and Graham and Rogers (2002)), we focus on the use of interest rate (IR) and
foreign exchange (FX) derivatives for non-trading purposes. If a rm-years 10-K has no reference of
our hedging keywords, or contains such keywords but the surrounding text suggests the rm does not
use derivatives, we treat that rm-year as non-user. We record a rms notional value of derivatives
contracts as well as the information on a rms long and short positions in derivatives.9
One must recognize that a rm might not use derivatives because it has no relevant IR or FX
exposure. To better understand the use of derivatives, we need to check whether the rm-years we
classify as non-users are ex-ante exposed to uctuations in IR and FX prices, or are otherwise taking
speculative positions. We determine whether rms in our sample are ex-ante exposed to those market
prices in two ways. First, we include keywords "expos" and "market risk" in our program search and
we make a note if a rm explicitly states that it has IR and/or FX exposures when we read its 10-K
ling. Second, we follow the procedure laid out in Graham and Rogers (2002, p.824) for identifying
ex-ante IR and FX exposures. We infer that a rm has no ex-ante exposure if it meets the following
three conditions: (1) it does not use any IR or FX derivatives; (2) it does not state in its 10-K that
it has ex-ante IR or FX exposures; and (3) the Graham and Rogersprocedure implies that the rm
has no ex-ante exposures. A total of 73 rms fall into this category. We exclude these rms from the
non-user category because they are not suitable counterfactuals to those rms that are exposed to IR
and FX prices and use hedging for risk management.
Finally, we match the sample of loan contracts with LPCs DealScan. This allows us to obtain
additional characteristics on loan contracts (such as loan size and maturity). We then gather ad-
ditional rm characteristics from COMPUSTAT. These include, among others, information on rm
size, protability, credit ratings, market valuation, asset tangibility, and cash ow volatility. Our nal
sample contains a total of 2,718 loan contracts signed by 1,185 individual rms.
B.2 Proxies and Summary Statistics
The majority of papers using derivatives data (e.g., Géczy et al. (1997), Allayannis and Weston
(2001), and Purnanandam (2008))) measure hedging activity with a hedging dummy and/or a con-
tinuous aggregate notional value of derivatives contracts (irrespective of the direction of the positions).
We follow this general approach and use multiple proxies for corporate hedging: (1) a dummy variable
9We use the denitions of long and short positions proposed by Graham and Rogers (2002). Specically, a long (short)
position is a contract that benets from rising (declining) interest rates or the appreciation (depreciation) of a foreign
currency. Net position is missing when information is insu¢ cient for us to judge if a derivatives position is long or short.
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for whether the rm reports IR hedging, (2) a continuous variable capturing the total notional value
of IR derivatives contracts scaled by the rms total assets, (3) a dummy variable for FX hedging,
(4) a continuous variable for the total notional value of FX derivatives contracts scaled by the rms
total assets, (5) a dummy variable for the existence of IR and/or FX hedging, and (6) a continuous
variable for the total notional value of IR and/or FX derivatives contracts scaled by the rms total
assets (hedging intensity).10
Panel A of Table I shows the summary statistics for our hedging variables. About 35.6% and
27.3% of the sample rm-years use IR and FX derivatives, respectively. Some 50.1% of the sample
rm-years use IR and/or FX derivatives. These proportions are somewhat higher than the corre-
sponding gures reported in Graham and Rogers (2002), who examine a random sample of 469 rms
(their corresponding gures are 25.0%, 24.2%, and 35.7%) for the scal year 1995-6. Regarding the
intensity of derivatives use by our sample rms, the total notional value of derivatives contracts for
derivatives users is about 13.8%, 7.5%, and 14.0% of total assets for IR hedging, FX hedging, and
IR/FX hedging, respectively. These gures are similar to those reported in Graham and Rogers
(2002), which equal 11.1%, 8.1%, and 13.2%.
Insert table I Here
Panel A also reports summary statistics on loan characteristics. The average loan size is about
291.6 million dollars, the average loan spread (based on DealScans all-in-spread drawn) is 188.6 basis
points over LIBOR, and the average loan maturity is 1,345 days (about 45 months). In addition,
73.1% of loan contracts have contingent performance-based pricing terms and 37.3% of the loans con-
tain an explicit restriction on capital expenditures. Finally, about 38.1% of the credit facilities in the
sample are term-loans, whereas the remainder can be classied as revolving and other loans. These
spread and maturity gures are higher than those found in related studies such as Chava et al. (2008)
and Ivashina (2009), who report spreads that average around 117 to 140 basis points over LIBOR
and maturity that averages about 39 months. The panel also reports summary statistics on rm
characteristics such as rm size (the natural log of book value of total assets), asset tangibility (net
PP&E over total assets), protability (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization
over total assets), cash ow volatility (the standard deviation of quarterly cash ows from operations
over the four scal years before the loan initiation year scaled by total debt), growth opportunities
(proxied by the market-to-book ratio), and leverage (dened as total debt/total assets).11
10Graham and Rogers (2002) is the only study using a net notional value (by o¤setting long and short positions).
We experiment with the use of net notional value as a robustness check for our main results.
11 It is useful to briey contrast the characteristics of the rms in our sample with those in the COMPUSTAT universe.
Standard mean-di¤erence tests suggest that our rms are somewhat larger. At the same time, rms in our sample and
those in COMPUSTAT have similar levels of tangibility, market-to-book ratio, and leverage. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
suggest that the industry composition (distribution) of our sample is indistinguishable from that of COMPUSTAT.
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In Panel B, we compare the characteristics of rms with and without hedging contracts in place
(hedgers versus non-hedgers). We nd that hedgers are larger, more leveraged, and exhibit lower cash
ow and asset volatility, as well as a lower default risk (as measured by Z-score). We also nd that
hedgers tend to have higher asset tangibility, although the di¤erence is not statistically signicant
at the 5% test level. These results are largely consistent with the previous ndings documented in
the literature (e.g., Nance et al. (1993) and Géczy et al. (1997)). More importantly, hedgers are
signicantly di¤erent from non-hedgers with respect to loan characteristics and investment spending.
Hedgers tend to access larger loans at lower loan spreads. Simple mean comparison between hedgers
and non-hedgers indicates a 31 basis points di¤erence in spreads, which is about 15% of the sample
average spread for non-hedgers. We also nd that hedgers, on average, are 20% less likely to have
capital expenditures restrictions in their loan agreements, and they tend to invest roughly 10% more
than non-hedgers. These univariate results provide preliminary support for our main hypotheses.
We, however, shall perform more rigorous tests in the following sections.
II Hedging and the Cost of Credit
A Baseline Model
We use regression analysis to examine the e¤ects of hedging on the cost of debt nancing. While the
literature o¤ers many ways to model the pricing of private credit agreements, we largely follow the
empirical model proposed by Graham et al. (2008)  itself a summary of prior modeling approaches.
That model contains a long list of drivers of loan interest rates (including rm characteristics, loan
characteristics, macroeconomic variables, and idiosyncratic-xed e¤ects) to which we add our hedging
variables. Our baseline model can be written in condensed form as follows:
Log(Loan Spread) = f (Hedging Variables, Firm Characteristics, Loan Characteristics
Macroeconomic Variables, Idiosyncratic Fixed E¤ects) (1)
As in Graham et al. (2008), we take the natural logarithm of loan spread to mitigate the e¤ect of
skewness in data. Importantly, the model controls for rm and loan characteristics that may a¤ect
loan spreads. For instance, prior literature has hypothesized that when a borrower has dealt with
the current lender in the past, there are fewer information asymmetries (e.g., Chava and Roberts
(2008)). We include the natural logarithm of (1 + the number of previous loans with the current
lender) as a proxy for the depth of the relationship between the borrower and lender, expecting it
to be negatively related to loan spreads. In addition, we expect rms with higher credit ratings to
obtain more favorable loan terms (e.g., a lower interest rate) than rms with lower or without ratings.
Accordingly, we include dummies for the borrowers S&P ratings categories in the model. About 26%
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of observations in our sample do not have a credit rating. To avoid loss of data, we assign a dummy
variable that equals one when credit rating is missing.
Our rm-level controls include rm size, protability, asset tangibility, M/B, cash ow volatility,
and leverage.12 We also include asset volatility in the model. In the presence of basis (unhedgeable)
risk, a higher degree of asset volatility typically means less hedging (see Haushalter (2000) and Brown
and Toft (2002)). To help assure that hedging is not simply capturing this e¤ect, one must control
for asset volatility.13 We expect a positive link between asset volatility and loan spread. Finally,
the modied Altmans (1968) Z-score is included to further control for default risk. A higher Z-score
indicates better nancial health and thus a lower default risk. We compute each of these proxies in
standard ways. To save space we describe the details of their calculations in Appendix II. The model
controls for industry-xed e¤ects by including industry dummies (2-digit SIC codes).
Importantly, all rm variables enter our models with a one-year lag from the loan origination.
In other words, we work with pre-determined values of those variables. So, for example, whether
the rm has a hedging policy in place is determined at least one year before the rm arranges the
loan contract whose characteristics we consider. Our tests correct the error structure for within-rm
correlation (clustering) and heteroskedasticity using the White-Hubers estimator.14
Following Graham et al. (2008), we also control for loan characteristics that might a¤ect spreads.
We include the natural log of loan size in the model to capture the potential economies of scale in bank
lending, which might result in a lower spread. Furthermore, we control for loan maturity (dened as
the natural log of maturity in days) because banks often require a liquidity premium for long-term
debt and the premium will translate into a higher spread. We also include a dummy variable for
performance pricing. We further control for the e¤ects of loan type and loan purpose. Loans can be
of di¤erent types, such as term loans, revolvers longer than one year, revolvers shorter than one year,
and 364-day loans. Chava et al. (2008) report that the pricing of term loans can be very di¤erent from
that of revolving loans, thus we include dummy variables for each loan type. Likewise, we classify loans
in loan purposecategories: working capital or general corporate purpose, renancing, acquisition,
commercial paper backup, and others. For brevity, the coe¢ cients of these dummies are not reported.
Macroeconomic conditions might also a¤ect loan pricing Graham et al. (2008). Relatedly, re-
cent literature (see Faulkender (2005) and Chernenko and Faulkender (2010)) shows that rms may
12We include leverage in our specication to conform to the existing literature (e.g., Graham et al. (2008) and
Ivashina (2009)). While we are concerned about biases that could arise from the inclusion of this variable, we
alternatively (1) use long lags of industry-level leverage as instruments for lagged rm-level leverage and (2) drop
leverage altogether from our specications. Our inferences are robust to any of these treatments.
13We compute asset volatility through the estimation of distance-to-default (DTD) using Mertons (1974) model.
The details are presented in Apendix II. We thank an anoymous referee for suggesting this idea.
14We do not include rm-xed e¤ects in our baseline estimations (in Table II) because 426 rms have just one loan
over the sample period that will be dropped from the rm-xed e¤ects estimation. In our robustness checks with
rm-xed e¤ects (see Table V), our inferences remain the same.
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selectively hedge their interest rate risks and time the use of derivatives based on macroeconomic
conditions. It is thus possible that rms may time loans in a way that is correlated with aggregate
conditions and hedging. To avoid this source of omitted variable bias, we follow this literature and
include credit spread and term spread as controls in our model. Credit spread is computed as the
di¤erence between the yields of BAA and AAA corporate bonds, and term spread is the di¤erence
between the yield of 10-year and 1-year Treasury bonds. The literature suggests that term spread
tends to widen in economic expansions and shrink in recessions. In contrast, the credit spread tends
to widen in recessions and shrink in expansions (see Graham et al.). We thus expect a positive link
between credit spread and loan spread and a negative link between term spread and loan spread.
In addition to the contract timing mismatch(imposed lag structure) described above, we high-
light the institutional mismatchbetween providers of hedging and loan contracts. In the U.S., only
a few, large nancial institutions  many of which are nonbank rms  o¤er hedging contracts. In
particular, according to 2002 statistics from the Feds regulatory dataset, the top 5 (10) providers
concentrated over 85% (95%) of the FX and IR hedging contracts outstanding. In contrast, the
loan contracts we examine come from a large spectrum of commercial banks (there are nearly 1,500
di¤erent banks in our sample). Very rarely the same nancial institution would provide the two
contracts examined in our tests. Indeed, we spot-checked the 10-Ks of a random sample of rms in
2002 and found no match between the providers of hedging and loan contracts. We also veried that
the largest 10 derivative providers lead only about 4% of the loans in our sample, and that our results
are insensitive to the deletion of these observations.
B A Tax-Based Instrumental Approach
Although we have taken precautions to address the issue of biases arising from reverse-causality and
omitted variables, endogeneity remains as a concern in our estimations. In this section, we develop
an instrumental variable approach to more explicitly handle concerns about estimation biases.
We identify a candidate instrument for hedging that arises from a salient feature of the rules gov-
erning corporate taxes; namely, tax convexity. The risk management literature has long argued that
hedging can lower the volatility of future taxable income, thus lowering expected tax liabilities for
rms facing convex tax schedules (e.g., Smith and Stulz (1985) and Graham and Smith (1999)). Green
and Talmor (1985), for example, show that in the presence of asymmetric tax treatment of positive
and negative incomes, the tax liability of a rm can be thought of as a government-written call option
on future income streams, with the strike price equal to the value of allowable deductions on taxable
earnings. Accordingly, as the volatility of pre-tax earnings declines, the value of the call option  the
amount of the tax liabilities  drops. This gives rms an incentive to hedge. Graham and Smith fur-
ther report that roughly 50% of the rms in COMPUSTAT face e¤ective tax functions that are convex.
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In the U.S., tax convexity is a function of the non-linear treatment assigned to corporate earnings
in the tax code (tax brackets), the existence of net operating loss carryforwards and carrybacks,15
investment tax credits, and the alternative minimum tax. The tax convexity estimation of Graham
and Smith (1999) captures all of the aforementioned features of the tax code and measures the ex-
pected tax savings from hedging. Notably, not all rms face the same tax convexities, nor would they
benet the same by hedging their income for tax reasons. Our instrumental approach builds on this
source of heterogeneity in rmshedging-related tax benets.
In what follows, we employ the procedure described in Graham and Smith (p.2256) to calculate
tax convexity. Specically, the expected percentage savings in tax liability arising from a 5% reduction
in the volatility of taxable income (denoted Convexity) is calculated for every rm-year as a follows:
Convexity = 4:88 + 0:019 TIV ol   5:50 TICorr   1:28DITC (2)
+ 3:29DNOL + 7:15DSmallNeg + 1:60DSmallPos
 4:77DNOL DSmallNeg   1:93DNOL DSmallPos;
where TIV ol is the volatility of taxable income, TICorr is the serial correlation of taxable income,
DITC is a dummy for investment tax credits, DNOL is a dummy for net operating losses, DSmallNeg
(DSmallPos) is a dummy for a small negative (positive) taxable income. We calculate the volatility
of taxable income and the serial correlation of taxable income on a rolling basis, using all available
historical annual data up to the year of interest. The other elements of the tax savings calculation are
directly observable in the rmsbalance sheets. Notice that the Graham-Smith formula uses data from
a small range of realizations around a zero-income tax kink. Instrument identication in that region
comes from the non-linear form of the income taxation function, rather than the income level itself
(which is already included in Eq. (1)). Indeed, Convexity is a highly non-linear function of income.
For our purposes, the key observation is that tax convexity provides incentives for rms to hedge
(instrument inclusion restriction), but a priori, there is no reason to expect it to directly a¤ect the
terms of bank loans (exclusion restriction). Under this premise, tax convexity is a plausible instrument
for hedging in a loan spread regression. Indeed, using the Graham-Smith tax-convexity construct,
prior papers have found support for the hypothesis that rms hedge with the goal of minimizing
taxes (e.g., Dionne and Garand (2003), Dionne and Triki (2005), and Lin et al. (2008)). Others,
however, nd only weak evidence of this e¤ect (e.g., Graham and Rogers (2002)). Accordingly, we
need to verify that our approach is robust to alternative assumptions about what is included in the
instrument set. This set must also have good statistical properties (pass validity and relevance tests).
The various tests reported below focus on demonstrating that our instrumental approach is sound.16
15Carryforwards and carrybacks tend to reduce the most extreme tax schedule curvatures, but they spread the
progressivity of taxes over a broader range of corporate incomes.
16For example, one potential concern with our instrument is that it is simply a proxy for asset or cash ow volatility.
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Our instrumental variable estimations are performed in two stages. In the rst stage, hedging
intensity is regressed on the lagged excluded instrument (Convexity) and all of the independent vari-
ables in the loan spread model (Eq. (1)). The predicted hedgingfrom the rst stage is then used
in the second-stage loan spread model. The rst-stage regression results are not reported in full to
save space; instead, the relevant test statistics are reported in all of our tables. In all cases, the tax
convexity variable is found to have a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on hedging. Accord-
ingly, as reported, the F -tests of the signicance of the instrument in the rst-stage model are always
highly signicant (p-values lower than 0.001). More illustrative than these exclusion F -tests, however,
are the Sheas (1997) R2s from the rst-stage regressions (also reported in all tables). These R2s
all exceed the suggested (rule of thumb) hurdle of 10%. These various statistics suggest that our
instrument is relevant in explaining the variation of our modelspotentially endogenous regressors.
C Empirical Results
C.1 Baseline Loan Spread Model
To gauge the direct e¤ect of hedging on loan spreads, we study, separately, an IR hedging dummy
for whether the rm has IR derivatives contracts in place; a continuous IR intensity hedging measure
(i.e., total notional value of IR derivatives contracts scaled by the rms total assets); a FX hedging
dummy; a continuous FX hedging intensity measure (total notional value of FX derivatives scaled
by total assets); an IR/FX hedging dummy combining the IR and FX dummies; and a continuous
IR/FX intensity measure (total notional value of IR and FX derivatives scaled by total assets). Our
inferences are similar for each one of these hedging proxies. To avoid redundancy, however, we only
discuss the results based on the IR/FX hedging intensity measure.17
Table II presents the results from estimating Eq. (1). Column (1) reports the coe¢ cients ob-
tained from a standard OLS model. The sample size drops slightly due to missing values on hedging
intensity. Column (2) reports estimates obtained from the IV approach. The results are qualitatively
similar, and we focus on the latter approach to save space. The estimates in column (2) deliver a very
signicant result. They imply that hedgers with average usage of IR/FX derivatives are charged loan
spreads that are 28% lower than non-hedgers (=  2:021 0:140, where 0.140 is the mean of IR/FX
hedging-to-asset ratio reported in Table I). Relative to the average loan spread of 189 basis points,
this represents a reduction of about 53 basis points. To present these e¤ects in an alternative way,
a one-standard deviation increase in hedging intensity at the average level of hedging leads to a 29%
reduction in spreads. Hedging has a strong, sizeable impact on the cost of credit.
To ameliorate this concern, we expunge from the calculation of Convexity those suspiciouscomponents proxying for
volatility (e.g., TIV ol). The results (available from the authors) are consistent with our the results presented below,
suggesting again that we do obtain independent variation coming from the tax-based instrument.
17Key results based on IR/FX hedging dummy can be found in the Internet Appendix of the paper.
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Regarding the control variables, each of the rm characteristics we use attracts the expected coef-
cient. For example, rms that have more established relations with their banks, are larger, are more
protable, have more tangible assets, are less leveraged, and have higher Z-scores all pay lower loan
spreads for the funds received under private agreements. These results resemble those of Graham
et al. (2008). Like those authors, we also obtain a negative relation between market-to-book ratios
and loan spreads. Loan characteristics such as loan size and maturity also conform to our priors.
The results for the macro variables, too, agree with our priors. Recall, our regressions, also include
a performance pricing dummy, loan type and purpose dummies, and credit ratings dummies; their
coe¢ cients are largely signicant, but omitted for brevity.
To our knowledge, this is the rst study in the literature to show that corporate hedging is as-
sociated with lower loan interest rates. These initial results complement and extend the nding of
Graham and Rogers (2002) that hedging increases a rms debt capacity. Both studies are consistent
with the notion that creditors value positively a rms decision to hedge, and they provide more
favorable credit terms to rms that hedge. Our results on the e¤ect of hedging on loan pricing are
also consistent with Petersen and Thiagarajans (2000) ndings on the moderating e¤ect of hedging
on the cost of equity. Together with these pieces of evidence, our results more broadly imply that
hedging eases rmsaccess to external nancing.
Table II About Here
C.2 Financial Distress and Risk-Shifting
To better characterize our story, we examine in more detail factors underlying the negative associa-
tion between hedging and loan spreads that we have uncovered. Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that if
nancial distress is costly, hedging can ease external funding by lowering income volatility. According
to their theory, hedging may be particularly more valuable for rms with a higher probability of
nancial distress. In contrast, the benets of hedging for nancially strong borrowers may be more
marginal. In what follows, we explore cross-sectional variation in rmsnancial positions to verify
whether our baseline results can indeed be attributed to existing hedging theories.
We examine the nancial distress argument by including Altmans Z-score and its interaction
with hedging in our baseline model. The result from this test is reported in column (3) of Table II.
We expect the uninteracted Z-score to have a negative impact on loan spreads since, all else equal,
healthier rms should be charged lower spreads. This is exactly what we nd, with a high degree of
statistical signicance. More interesting, however, is the coe¢ cient of the hedgingZ-score interaction
term. This term returns a positive, statistically signicant coe¢ cient, implying a weakening of the
negative association between Z-score and loan spreads for rms that hedge. Put di¤erently, consis-
tent with the theory, hedging is particularly more valuable for borrowers with a higher likelihood of
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nancial distress. It is interesting to gauge the economic signicance of our results. The estimates
in column (3) imply that a one-standard deviation decline in Z-score increases the loan spread of an
average hedger by 16 basis points less than a similar decline in Z-score for a non-hedger.
In addition to ameliorating nancial distress risk, theory suggests that hedging may be benecial
for creditors by limiting rmsscope for substitution towards riskier investments (risk-shifting). It
is thus interesting to examine if the dynamics of our hedgingloan spreads results are modulated by
the degree to which rms might be able to engage in asset substitution. While it is di¢ cult to gauge
directly a rms ability to risk-shift, standard nance theory suggests that rms with more growth
opportunities tend to be riskier than rms with fewer growth opportunities (see, e.g., Jensen and
Meckling (1976)). Under this conjecture, we would expect that the e¤ect of hedging in lowering loan
spreads to be greater for rms with more growth opportunities. To test this idea, we interact M/B
with hedging in the loan spread model. The results are reported in column (4) of Table II. Our tests
show that the coe¢ cients of the hedgingM/B interaction term are always negative and statistically
signicant. Accordingly, the estimates we report suggest that the negative e¤ect of hedging on loan
spreads is greater  i.e., hedging is more valuable  for rms whose investment opportunity set
is more likely to allow for risk-shifting. Another way to interpret the coe¢ cients in the table is to
recognize the benets of hedging through the e¤ect it has on the cost of funds of growth rms. Using
the gures from column (4), we obtain that increasing M/B by one unit (which is about one standard
deviation of M/B) decreases loan spreads of an average hedger by 11 basis points less than a similar
increase in M/B for a rm without hedging contracts in place.
III Hedging and Investment
One way in which the benets of hedging may manifest relates to the contractual restrictions creditors
impose on rms that hedge. In particular, together with lower interest rates, it is likely that creditors
will impose fewer contractual restrictions on rmsspending when hedging insuranceis in place (see
Bessembinder (1991)). Naturally, the relevant question is whether hedging ultimately shapes the rms
investment process. These important questions on the real-side implications of nancial decisions have
been largely ignored in the hedging literature. This section examines both of these questions.
A Capital Expenditure Restrictions
We rst examine whether hedging has a direct impact on investment restrictions in loan agreements.
Research suggests that investment restriction clauses in bank loans are particularly interesting because
these clauses are tailored according to the particular characteristics of each borrower, di¤erently from
the generally-wordedindentures of public bonds. Accordingly, the choice of including capital expen-
ditures restrictions in debt contracts should closely reect creditorsassessment of borrower-specic
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credit risk.
We examine this hypothesis by regressing a dummy variable denoting the existence of capital
expenditure restrictions on IR/FX hedging intensity, controlling for various rm and loan character-
istics. The controls used in these estimations are similar to those in Eq. (1). All models are estimated
via probit-IV.
Table III About Here
Our results are reported in Table III. To ease the exposition, the coe¢ cient estimates are trans-
formed to represent the marginal e¤ects evaluated at the means of the independent variables from the
regressions. The rm characteristic coe¢ cients (e.g., size, protability, and leverage) are comparable
to those observed in the loan spreads of Table II (the same economic intuition applies, which we omit
for brevity).
More important for our purposes are the coe¢ cients associated with hedging. The estimates show
a negative, statistically signicant relation between hedging and the odds of having capital expen-
diture restrictions in loan agreements. Specically, results from column (1), imply that being an
average IR/FX hedger decreases the probability of having an expenditure restriction by about 20%.
This number is quite signicant. Relative to the sample mean, it represents a 54% decline in the odds
of having a capital expenditure restriction.
The evidence in Table III suggests a new channel through which hedging improves corporate
outcomes: it reduces the odds that creditors will impose constraints on rmsinvestment decisions.
We believe our evidence is important in ashing out precise mechanisms that underlie links between
nancial and investment decisions inside the rm. While there is evidence that these decisions move
together (see Stein (2003) for a review), we still know very little about how they are connected. The
evidence introduced by this paper helps us better understand these connections.
Finally, we have shown that nancial distress and risk-shifting proxies modulate the e¤ect of
hedging on the cost of external funding. The same rationale used in the tests of Section C.2 applies
when examining the impact of hedging on the investment covenants: higher nancial distress risk and
higher potential for asset substitution should make hedging particularly more desirable for creditors,
leading to a relaxation on investment covenants. We verify these hypotheses in turn.
We augment the capital restriction covenants of column (1) with the inclusion of an interaction
term for hedging and Z-score (similar to the approach of Table II). The results are reported in column
(2). The estimates show that rms with a higher chance of nancial distress (as denoted by a low Z-
score) are more likely to be imposed capital expenditure restrictions. At the same time, given an hypo-
thetical one-standard deviation drop in Z-score, a non-hedger will see a 15.5% increase in the likelihood
that its lender will impose a capital expenditure restriction, while for a counterfactual hedger rm the
increase in the likelihood of a restriction is only one third of that, or a statistically insignicant 5.2%.
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In column (3) we interact M/B with hedging intensity. The coe¢ cient returned for the hedging
M/B interaction term is negative and statistically signicant. The estimation suggests that growth
rms that hedge have lower odds of having capital expenditure restrictions in their loans.
B The Impact of Hedging on Investment Spending
Our ndings suggest that hedging reduces the incidence of investment restrictions in loan agreements.
This should give rms greater exibility in their investment decisions. Since we also nd that hedgers
raise funds at lower costs, it would be natural to investigate whether nancial hedging programs
ultimately shape rms investment spending (see also Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000)). In this
section, we estimate empirical investment models in which a rms asset-scaled capital expenditures
are regressed on a large set of variables containing information on rm and loan characteristics, as
well as on hedging. This set of variables, which come from Eq. (1), encompasses those commonly
found in the corporate investment literature (see, e.g., Kaplan and Zingales (1997)).18
The results from the IV estimations of our investment model are in Table IV. All of our estimations
return a positive, statistically signicant coe¢ cient for hedging, suggesting that hedgers are able to
invest more than non-hedgers. The results under column (1), for example, suggest that being an av-
erage IR and/or FX hedger increases a rms investment by about 12.9% relative to the sample mean
level of annual investment (= 0:071  0:14=0:077). Other regressors in the model obtain expected
coe¢ cients. For example, investment is positively related to greater access to loans (as indicated by
having prior relations with the current lender, larger loan size, and longer loan maturity) and higher
Z-scores. Investment also responds positively to M/B and protability.
Table IV About Here
We also interact hedging with Z-score and M/B. We do so because we expect the impact of hedg-
ing on investment to vary across rms that face di¤erent likelihood of distress and have di¤erent
investment choice sets. Results under column (2) of Table IV show that the coe¢ cient on the inter-
action term between hedging and Z-score is negative and signicant, implying that hedging relaxes
the link between Z-score and investment. In particular, they imply that low Z-score rms that hedge
invest more than low Z-score rms that do not hedge. To use a concrete example, consider again a
one-standard deviation drop in Z-score. For a rm that does not hedge that decline will lead to a
drop in investment of about 9.5% of the average sample investment rate. For an average hedger, the
same drop in Z-score would imply an equivalent drop in investment of only 4.6% of the sample mean.
Column (3) reports results from a model in which we interact hedging and M/B. The hedgingM/B
interaction term is positive and statistically signicant, supporting the idea that hedging allows rms
18Standard investment models are quite parsimonious and often include only proxies for Q(equivalent to M/B in
our analysis) and cash ow (or protability).
16
with greater growth options to invest more. For example, increasing M/B by one unit boosts annual
investment rate by 3% for average hedgers, which is about 39% of the sample mean of investment.
The ndings of this section complement and extend the existing evidence on nancing frictions and
investment. Chava and Roberts (2008) nd that a borrowers capital expenditures decline by about
13% in response to a nancial covenant violation. Nini et al. (2009) further document that capital
expenditure restrictions are common, and borrowing rmsinvestment rate fall by 15% (relative to the
sample mean) after an investment restriction is imposed on their loans. In contrast, we nd that being
an average IR/FX hedger reduces the chance of having a capital expenditure restriction by about
20%, and that engaging in hedging activities increases a rms annual investment rate by about 13%
(relative to sample mean). Further analyses that we conduct considering nancial distress risk and
growth opportunities provide additional insights about the impact of hedging on investment spending.
IV Robustness Checks
In this section, we test the robustness of our inferences to the use of alternative hedging measures and
estimation methods. We do so perturbing the estimation that produces our weakest results (under col-
umn (1) of Table II). First, Graham and Rogers (2002) argue that the net notional value of derivatives
might be a better measure of a rms hedging position than the total notional value. As a robustness
check, in column (1) of Table V we measure the extent of hedging as the net notional value of deriv-
atives contracts scaled by total assets. As some rms are vague in reporting the direction of hedging
positions in their SEC lings, we follow Graham and Rogers and exclude these unsure casesfrom
the analysis. Still, the estimated hedging premium (reduction in loan spreads) associated with
a one-standard deviation increase in hedging remains economically signicant, equal to 23%. The
conclusion that hedging lowers loan spread is robust to the use of net notional value of derivatives.
Table V About Here
Second, we experiment with proxies for the likelihood of future default in our baseline model.
Recent research has proposed the use of distance-to-default (DTD) as a plausible candidate. In
the bank loan literature, Drucker and Puri (2009) use this measure to assess whether a borrower may
default in the future, which a¤ects the expected length of the relationship with its lender. Follow-
ing Drucker and Puri, we implement the DTD measure that is operationalized in Crosbie and Bohn
(2003). In column (2) of Table V, we use this proxy in lieu of Z-score. The DTD proxy attracts the
expected negative coe¢ cient, but this brings no signicant changes to the coe¢ cient of the IR/FX
hedging-to-asset variable. Although not reported in the table, we reestimate all our hedgingZ-score
interactive models replacing Z-score with DTD. Our conclusions about the interplay between distress
and hedging remain the same.
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About 60% of our sample rms have more than one loan in the 19962002 period. We exploit the
panel data structure of part of our sample to check whether our results are robust to the inclusion
of controls for time-invariant rm characteristics. In column (3) of Table V, we estimate a rm-xed
e¤ects regression. Naturally, the rms that have just one loan in our sample period are dropped from
the estimation. Yet, the reduced sample provides an opportunity to gauge the tenor of our results.
We nd that the IR/FX hedging proxy still attracts a negative and highly signicant coe¢ cient.
While the statistics reported in Table I suggest little evidence of gross outliers in loan spreads,
we estimate a median regression as an additional check. The result on the IR/FX hedging ratio in
column (4) of Table V is qualitatively similar to that of our baseline regressions
Finally, note that our analysis is conducted at the loan level. However, as discussed in Graham et
al. (2008), individual loans are often part of a multiple-loan deals, and their terms may simply reect
the deal-level negotiation (i.e., they are not completely independent observations). Treating these
loans as independent credit facilities could inate the statistical signicance of our results. To check
whether this is an issue, we follow Graham et al. and aggregate loans into deals using loan-size
weighted averages of the relevant loan terms. The slope estimate for the IR/FX hedging variable in
column (5) of Table V indicates the deal-level bias story does not a¤ect our inferences.
We also perform robustness checks for our regression models on the probability of having a capital
expenditure restriction in a loan contract. These checks (available upon request) indicate that our
inferences about investment restrictions are equally robust to changes in model specication, sample
selection, and use of alternative econometric techniques.
V The Economic Value of Corporate Hedging
Our analysis shows evidence that hedging reduces interest rate spreads and the incidence of invest-
ment restrictions in loan agreements, which in turn result in higher investment rates. These ndings
are consistent with existing evidence on the valuation gains associated with hedging (e.g., Allayannis
and Weston (2001)). It is therefore natural that we dig deeper into the economic value of corporate
hedging. In this section, we rst study the relation between hedging and the true cost of corporate
debt; i.e., we go beyond the analysis of loan spreads. We then look at the value implication of in-
vestment increases that come from hedging. While the tests performed here are more tentative, they
provide a step forward in our understanding of the economic implications of hedging.
A Hedging and the True Cost of Debt
Our tests show that hedging lowers contractual loan spreads. These results are interesting in their
own right, however, they need not imply that hedging reduces the rms true cost of debt.
The rms observed debt spread includes a portion compensating investors for the expected default
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loss and a portion compensating investors for the undiversiable risk of debt (i.e., the expected return
premium or truecost of debt).19 More precisely, the contractual debt yield can be expressed as:
Promised Debt Yield = Cost of Debt + Yield Equivalent of Expected Default Loss. (3)
In our case, the observed drop in the loan spread (promised debt yield) for hedgers could be caused
by a drop in the expected default risk premium, rather than a drop in the (true) cost of debt, as a
result of hedging. This distinction is important in that only the latter e¤ect is a su¢ cient condition
for hedging to increase rm value via debt nancing.20
In this section, we examine how hedging a¤ects the cost of debt. Our analysis builds on recent
empirical studies decomposing promised interest rates into expected default risk premia and underly-
ing debt costs (e.g., Elton et al. (2001) and Cooper and Davydenko (2007)). We leave the details of
the computation of these di¤erent components to Appendix I. Here, we are interested in testing the
empirical relation between the computed cost of debt and hedging.
Table I shows that the mean cost of debt in our sample is 132 basis points, roughly 70% of the
mean promised loan spread. This relative ratio is very similar to the 66% gure reported in Elton et
al. (2001).21 Table VI presents results from regressing the log of true cost of debt on rm hedging.
The estimated models are similar to Eq. (1), except that the dependent variable (Cost of Debt)
is computed as Eq. (5) in Appendix I. The results in the table show a negative and statistically
signicant relation between hedging intensity and Cost of Debt, suggesting that hedging helps lower
not only the promised loan spreads (as in Table II), but also the true cost of debt. When we include
the interaction between hedging and Z-score or the interaction between M/B ratio and hedging, we
obtain results that, again, resemble those of Table II. That is, hedging has a particularly strong e¤ect
on the true cost of debt of those rms that are near distress or that are more likely to risk-shift.
Table VI About Here
B Estimating the Real-Side Benets and Costs of Corporate Hedging Programs
A natural and interesting question is whether hedging adds value by boosting a rms real-side activi-
ties. In our context, a rm may benet from the additional investment that is made possible as a result
of hedging. Hedging programs, however, are not cost-free. Bearing in mind the limitations of the data,
we try to provide a rough estimation of the net gains from hedging for the average rm in our sample.
Benets. The proportional change in loan spreads that is brought about by hedging can be cal-
culated by multiplying the regression coe¢ cient in column (2) of Table II (=  2:02) by the rms
19See Elton et al. (2001) and Cooper and Davydenko (2007) for detailed discussions.
20We thank Mitchell Petersen (the editor) for raising this point.
21Estimates for comparable subsamples in Cooper and Davydenko (2007) range from 74% to 85%. The sample size
drops due to missing values of variables used to estimate the true cost of debt.
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hedging amount (IR/FX hedging). The annual interest rate saving can be then estimated by multi-
plying the reduction in loan spread and the total amount of loans in a rm-year. The return from
additional investment can be computed as follows: regression coe¢ cient in column (1) of Table IV
(= 0:07)  hedging amount  lagged total assets  mean ROA in the previous ve years.
Costs. The rm needs to pay a bid-ask spread when entering an IR/FX derivatives contract, and
it also needs to pay a premium for buying an option contract. Costs arising from bid-ask spreads in
forward and swap contracts are calculated at 1.5 basis points of the notional value of those derivatives
(cf. Hull (2008)). The costs associated with the options contract is calculated at 1.5 basis points
of the notional value (estimated from Brown (2001)). Option premium may vary according to the
underlying security, time to maturity, and other factors. While information on premiums for over-the-
counter option contracts is not available, we use the average 1% premium rate for an at-the-money
option traded at the Philadelphia Stock Exchange as a proxy. Annual cost of running a hedging
program is estimated at 1.5 basis point of annual sales (see Brown (2001)).
We then compute the di¤erence between the above benets and costs. Finally, after applying
a rms simulated marginal tax rate to the computed net gain, we compare it to the rms income
before extraordinary items.22 We nd that the average rm in our sample has an annual net gain
from hedging of about 4.7% of its annual income. It is worth noting, however, that our estimate is
likely to be a conservative gure. First, we do not consider many other benets of hedging in the
analysis (e.g., improved contract terms when dealing with stakeholders such as suppliers and employ-
ees). Second, our calculation is likely to overstate the cost of hedging. For example, rms engaging in
the use of options may buy and sell options simultaneously (e.g., using a collar strategy) in order to
lower the cost of derivatives hedging. Indeed, the rm analyzed in Brown (2001) reports a negative
option premium, suggesting that the rm sells more options than that it buys.
While the evidence in this section is arguably more tentative, it substantiates the notion that
hedging contributes to corporate valuation. This is an important nding in that it may help us
understand  though not fully explain  evidence suggesting that hedging adds value (e.g., Allayan-
nis and Weston (2001)). Future research should further our knowledge of the value implications of
corporate hedging.
VI Concluding Remarks
While research on corporate risk management has long focused on the determinants of corporate
hedging, recent studies investigate the value implications of hedging. This paper advances the re-
search in the area by examining the e¤ects of hedging policies on rmsaccess to capital (the price
of bank loans) and on their ability to invest (contractual restrictions on investment spending). We
22We thank John Graham for providing us the simulated marginal tax rates.
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present evidence that rms pay lower interest rate spreads and are less likely to have covenants re-
stricting their investment in private credit agreements after hedging programs are put in place. The
results we nd are consistent with theories proposing that hedging works as a commitment mecha-
nism that limits the set of possible cash ow realizations, which in turn eases rmsaccess to external
funding. Conrming the logic of our base results, we nd that the e¤ects of hedging on loan prices
and covenants are modulated by proxies associated with rm risk. For example, rms with higher
nancial distress costs pay lower interest rates on their loans when they have hedging policies put in
place prior to signing their credit agreements.
Our paper provides new insights into the importance of corporate hedging, characterizing the
channels through which hedging a¤ects corporate outcomes  e¤ects that are likely to be reected
in rm valuation. For example, the negative relation between hedging and loan spreads that we
uncover shows how hedging a¤ects a rms nancing costs. Our ndings on the e¤ect of hedging
on the odds of contractual restrictions on capital expenditures illustrate yet another channel of how
nancial contracting a¤ects investment and corporate welfare.
Taken altogether, our ndings provide additional rationales for hedging showing that these policies
are positively valued by creditors and might ultimately translate into gains for all corporate stake-
holders by facilitating the investment. These insights might help us better understand the role of
corporate hedging and may help delineate the size and scope of the market for derivatives instruments.
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Appendix I: A Note on Estimating The Cost of Debt
We follow the procedure suggested by Cooper and Davydenko (2007) to decompose the loan spread
into the cost of debt and the expected default loss on the outstanding debt. First, we solve for asset
volatility () and maturity of debt (T ) from the two simultaneous equations in the risky debt pricing
model of Merton (1974); i.e., (1  pD) = N(d1) pDesT N(d2) and E (1  pD) =  N(d1), where pD
is the rms leverage, s is the loan spread, E is the equity volatility, N(.) is the cumulative normal
distribution function, d1 = [ ln(pD) (s 0.5 2)T ]/(
p
T ), and d2 = d1 
p
T .
Second, we estimate the cost of equity (rE) based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model using the
market risk premium calculated as the average annual premium of the CRSP value-weighted index
return over the risk-free rate over the preceding 30 years. We then calculate the risk premium on
assets as  = (rE   r)  / E , where r is risk-free rate.
Third, we estimate the expected default loss on the debt:
 =  (1=T )ln[e( s)TN( d1   (rE   r)
p
T=E)=pD +N(d2 + (rE   r)
p
T=E)] (4)
Finally, the cost of debt is obtained as:
Cost of Debt = Loan Spread (s) Yield Equivalent of Expected Default Loss () (5)
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Appendix II: Data Denitions
Variable names Variable denitions and corresponding COMPUSTAT data items
Firm hedging information
IR hedging dummy Equals one if a rm/year engages in interest rate hedging.
IR hedging Total notional value of interest rate derivatives contracts/total assets
(data6).
FX hedging dummy Equals one if a rm/year engages in foreign exchange rate hedging.
FX hedging Total notional value of foreign currency derivatives contracts/total
assets (data6).
IR/FX hedg. dummy Equals one if a rm/year engages in IR and/or FX hedging.
IR/FX hedging Total notional value of interest rate and foreign currency derivatives
contracts/total assets (data6).
Net IR/FX hedging (Absolute net notional value of interest rate derivatives contracts
+ absolute net notional value of foreign currency derivatives con-
tracts)/total assets (data6).
Net notional value in each class of derivatives is calculated by o¤set-
ting long and short positions in the manner of Graham and Rogers
(2002). A long position is a contract that benets from rising interest
rates or the appreciation of a foreign currency. We add basis swaps
(that are an exchange of oating rate indices) to the absolute net
notional value of IR derivatives. Cases when information is not suf-
cient for us to judge whether a derivatives position is long or short
are excluded from the calculation of net position.
Firm characteristics
Log assets Natural log of total assets = log(data6).
Protability Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization
(EBITDA)/total assets = data13/data6.
Tangibility Net property, plant and equipment/total assets = data8/data6.
Cash ow volatility Standard deviation of quarterly cash ows from operations (quar-
terly data 108) over the four scal years prior to the loan initiation
year/total debt.
M/B (Market-to-book) (Market value of equity plus the book value of debt)/total assets =
(data25 data199 + data6 data60)/data6.
Leverage (Long-term debt + debt in current liabilities)/total assets = (data9
+ data34)/data6.
Z-score Modied Altmans (1968) Z-score = (1.2working capital + 1.4
retained earnings + 3.3EBIT + 0.999sales)/total assets =
(1.2data179 + 1.4data36 + 3.3data170 + 0.999data12)/data6.
The ratio of market value of equity to book value of total debt is omit-
ted from calculation, because market-to-book enters the regressions
as a separate variable.
Distance-to-default A market-based measure of default risk based on KMV-Merton
methodology described in Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and is equal to
(Va D)/(Va a), where D is debt, dened as the debt in current lia-
bilities plus one-half long-term debt, Va is the market value of assets,
and a is the one-year asset volatility. Va and a are unobservable.
They are approximated by using the market value of equity (Ve), the
one-year equity volatility (e), the three-month treasury bill rate (r),
and debt (D) to solve Mertons (1974) model of pricing a rms debt
and equity for a one-year time horizon (T = 1): Ve = Va N(d1) e r
D N(d2), and e = N(d1) a Va / Ve, where d1 = ( ln(Va/D) + r +
0.5 2a ) / a, and d2 = d1 a.
Asset volatility Dened as a in the calculation of distance-to-default.
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Covenant restrictions
on CAPEX
Dummy variable that takes the value one when there is a restriction
on capital expenditure in debt covenant.
Investment/lagged
assets
Capital expenditure/lagged total assets = (data128/lagged data6).
Firms previous loans Natural log of (1 + the number of previous loan contracts between
the borrowing rm and the current bank lender), a proxy for previous
lending relationship.
Marginal tax rate Marginal tax rate is the simulated marginal tax rates that are ob-
tained from John Graham and is measured before a rm/years hedg-
ing activities.
Tax convexity A dollar amount of tax saving from a ve percent reduction in the
volatility of taxable income, calculated as a function of a small nega-
tive taxable income dummy, a small positive taxable income dummy,
volatility of taxable income, serial correlation of taxable income, the
existence of investment tax credit in balance sheet, the existence of
net operating losses and its interaction with the small negative and
positive income dummies. Further detailes are in Graham and Smith
(1999, p.2256). We calculate both volatility of taxable income and
serial correlation of taxable income on a rolling basis using all avail-
able historical annual data (since 1965) up to a particular calculation
year. Since our regression models have separately included a cash
ow volatility measure, we also estimate a modied tax convexity by
omitting volatility of taxable income from the convexity calculation
and the results are robust.
Credit rating dummies Dummy variable for each category of S&P rm ratings including
AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, a B or worse rating. We also assign a dummy
for rms without the S&P rating.
Loan characteristics
Loan spread Loan spread is measured as all-in-spread drawn charged by the bank
over LIBOR for the drawn portion of the loan facility, reported in the
DealScan database.
Cost of debt Loan spread minus yield equivalent of expected default loss (), calcu-
lated according to the procedure suggested by Cooper and Davydenko
(2007).
Log maturity Natural log of the loan maturity in days.
Log loan size Natural log of the loan (facility) amount, measured in millions of
dollars.
Performance pricing
dummy
Dummy variable that equals one if the loan facility uses performance
pricing.
Loan type dummies Dummy variable for each loan type, including term loan, revolver
greater than one year, revolver less than one year, and 364-day facility.
Loan purpose
dummies
Dummy variable for loan purposes, including corporate purpose,
working capital, debt repayment, acquisition, backup line for com-
mercial paper, and others.
Others
Industry dummies Industry dummies are based on 2-digit SIC code.
Credit spreads The di¤erence between the yields of average BAA corporate bond and
AAA corporate bond.
Term spreads The di¤erence between the yields of 10-years Treasury bonds and
1-year Treasury bonds.
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Table I. Summary Statistics
Panel A: Full sample summary statistics Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75
Firm hedging information
IR hedging dummy 2,718 0.356 0.479 0 0 1
IR hedging (for hedgers) 869 0.138 0.124 0.044 0.107 0.201
FX hedging dummy 2,718 0.273 0.446 0 0 1
FX hedging (for hedgers) 602 0.075 0.105 0.011 0.037 0.091
IR/FX hedging dummy 2,718 0.501 0.500 0 1 1
IR/FX hedging (for hedgers) 1,143 0.140 0.142 0.040 0.100 0.196
Net IR/FX hedging 886 0.133 0.131 0.039 0.093 0.185
Firm characteristics
Firms previous loans 2,718 1.547 0.866 1.099 1.609 2.197
Log assets 2,718 6.538 1.617 5.324 6.521 7.579
Protability 2,718 0.136 0.101 0.089 0.131 0.181
Tangibility 2,718 0.333 0.230 0.151 0.274 0.466
Cash ow volatility 2,711 0.759 1.865 0.076 0.148 0.342
M/B 2,718 0.825 1.039 0.142 0.484 1.015
Leverage 2,718 0.295 0.245 0.126 0.259 0.415
Z-score 2,718 1.861 1.220 1.070 1.835 2.543
Distance-to-default 2,718 2.464 2.079 0.984 1.861 3.308
Asset volatility 2,718 0.452 0.375 0.227 0.374 0.574
Covenant restrictions on CAPEX 2,429 0.373 0.483 0 0 1
Investment/lagged assets 2,449 0.077 0.087 0.030 0.052 0.089
Syndicated loan characteristics
Log loan spread (all-in-drawn) 2,718 4.939 0.824 4.382 5.165 5.570
Loan spread (all-in-drawn) 2,718 188.602 157.722 80.000 175.000 262.500
Cost of debt 1,482 131.563 110.803 49.987 99.008 187.276
Log loan size ($M) 2,718 4.697 1.501 3.807 4.828 5.704
Loan size ($M) 2,718 291.566 712.596 45 125 300
Log maturity (days) 2,679 6.995 0.720 6.579 7.065 7.496
Maturity (days) 2,679 1,344.697 747.454 720 1,170 1,800
Performance pricing 2,718 0.731 0.444 0 1 1
Term loan 2,718 0.381 0.486 0 0 1
Working capital/ corporate purposes 2,718 0.264 0.441 0 0 1
Renancing 2,718 0.360 0.480 0 0 1
Acquisitions 2,718 0.250 0.433 0 0 1
Backup line 2,718 0.105 0.307 0 0 0
Other 2,718 0.027 0.163 0 0 0
Macro controls
Credit spreads 2,718 0.841 0.245 0.630 0.790 0.910
Term spreads 2,718 0.913 0.985 0.210 0.590 1.610
Panel B: Nonhedgers vs. hedgers (1) (2) (3)
Variable Non-hedgers Hedgers Di¤:(1)(2)
Loan spread 201.724 170.521 31.203***
Covenant restrictions on CAPEX 0.413 0.329 0.084***
Investment/lagged assets 0.074 0.081 -0.007**
Log assets 6.058 7.174 -1.116***
Tangibility 0.326 0.344 -0.017*
M/B 0.819 0.826 -0.006
Leverage 0.274 0.323 -0.049***
Z-score 1.825 1.919 -0.094**
Cash ow volatility 0.897 0.560 0.337***
Asset volatility 0.491 0.398 0.092***
Log loan size ($M) 4.312 5.211 -0.900***
Log maturity (days) 6.992 6.997 -0.004
Cost of debt 137.980 126.093 11.887**
Notes: The summary statistics are based on the sample used in regression analyses.
***, ** and * denote statistical signicance of the t-tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
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Table II. Hedging and Loan Spreads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IR/FX hedging -1.639*** -2.021*** -2.028*** -1.743***
(0.375) (0.315) (0.343) (0.281)
IR/FX hedging  Z-score 0.496***
(0.165)
IR/FX hedging  M/B -0.407***
(0.114)
Firms previous loans -0.067** -0.056* -0.052* -0.051**
(0.033) (0.030) (0.031) (0.024)
Log asset -0.132* -0.133* -0.138** -0.135
(0.077) (0.076) (0.070) (0.084)
Protability -0.602** -0.535* -0.573 -0.548**
(0.246) (0.297) (0.378) (0.266)
Tangibility -0.121 -0.122** -0.131 -0.141**
(0.094) (0.053) (0.089) (0.068)
Cash ow volatility 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002
(0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008)
M/B -0.121*** -0.124*** -0.129*** -0.081**
(0.038) (0.039) (0.030) (0.038)
Leverage 0.342* 0.363** 0.318* 0.334
(0.183) (0.178) (0.174) (0.267)
Z-score -0.105** -0.098*** -0.099** -0.107***
(0.049) (0.032) (0.045) (0.022)
Asset volatility 0.263*** 0.374*** 0.330*** 0.373***
(0.078) (0.101) (0.089) (0.093)
Log loan size -0.062 -0.057 -0.065* -0.060
(0.046) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037)
Log maturity (in days) 0.132 0.167 0.176* 0.172
(0.084) (0.123) (0.099) (0.244)
Credit spread 0.382* 0.471* 0.442** 0.497**
(0.218) (0.260) (0.174) (0.235)
Term spread -0.039 -0.042 -0.048 -0.044
(0.032) (0.036) (0.033) (0.035)
Credit rating dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Performance pricing Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan type Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry e¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,464 2,267 2,267 2,267
Sheas partial R2 (hedging term) n.a. 0.129 0.138 0.131
Sheas partial R2 (interaction term) n.a. n.a. 0.149 0.173
1st-stage F-test (p-value) n.a. 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R2 (2nd-stage) 0.512 0.576 0.578 0.581
Notes: The dependent variable is log of loan spread. In column (1), results are estimated via OLS. In columns (2) to
(4), results are obtained from IV estimations. The instrumental variable for hedging is a rms tax convexity (Graham
and Smith (1999)). Shea (1997)s partial R2 is a measure of IV relevance. 1st-stage F-test is the test of excluded IV in
the 1st-stage regression. IR/FX hedging is the total amount of interest rate and currency hedging scaled by assets. All
variable denitions are reported in Appendix II. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the rm level
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table III. Hedging and Capital Expenditure Covenant Restrictions
(1) (2) (3)
IR/FX hedging -1.471*** -1.738*** -1.507***
(0.278) (0.307) (0.300)
IR/FX hedging  Z-score 0.603***
(0.123)
IR/FX hedging  M/B -0.362***
(0.071)
Firms previous loans -0.022 -0.027** -0.026*
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
Log asset -0.209** -0.216** -0.212**
(0.095) (0.096) (0.091)
Protability -0.206* -0.223 -0.211**
(0.119) (0.179) (0.103)
Tangibility -0.104* -0.106** -0.098
(0.058) (0.051) (0.067)
Cash ow volatility 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
M/B -0.104*** -0.110*** -0.113***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.031)
Leverage 0.143* 0.243** 0.154*
(0.085) (0.115) (0.080)
Z-score -0.135*** -0.127** -0.132***
(0.038) (0.050) (0.044)
Asset volatility 0.195** 0.175** 0.194**
(0.090) (0.085) (0.086)
Log loan size 0.025* 0.035* 0.034**
(0.013) (0.020) (0.014)
Log maturity (in days) 0.183* 0.181* 0.184**
(0.098) (0.097) (0.088)
Credit spread 0.223** 0.197* 0.189
(0.104) (0.113) (0.146)
Term spread -0.038* -0.017 -0.027
(0.022) (0.014) (0.023)
Credit rating dummies Yes Yes Yes
Performance pricing Yes Yes Yes
Loan type Yes Yes Yes
Loan purpose Yes Yes Yes
Industry e¤ect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,235 2,235 2,235
Pseudo R2 0.253 0.258 0.257
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that is one if there is covenant restriction on capital expenditure, otherwise
it is zero. The results are obtained from probit-IV estimations. The instrument for hedging is a rms tax convexity.
IR/FX hedging is the total amount of interest rate and currency hedging scaled by assets. All variable denitions are
reported Appendix II. The table reports the marginal e¤ects that are evaluated at the means of continous independent
variables. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the rm level are reported in parentheses. *, **,
and *** represent statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table IV. Investment Equations
(1) (2) (3)
IR/FX hedging 0.0711*** 0.0652*** 0.0782***
(0.0201) (0.0250) (0.0240)
IR/FX hedging  Z-score -0.0223***
(0.0041)
IR/FX hedging  M/B 0.0230***
(0.0053)
Firms previous loans 0.0021 0.0033** 0.0022*
(0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0011)
Log asset 0.0011 0.0008* 0.0010**
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Protability 0.0010* 0.0006 0.0011**
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Cash ow volatility -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0015
(0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0026)
M/B 0.0262*** 0.0170** 0.0268***
(0.0100) (0.0081) (0.0091)
Leverage -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0031**
(0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0015)
Z-score 0.0047** 0.0060*** 0.0050**
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0023)
Asset volatility -0.0121** -0.0106** -0.0105**
(0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0050)
Log loan size 0.0015 0.0014** 0.0016
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0013)
Log maturity (in days) 0.0035** 0.0035 0.0031*
(0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0018)
Credit spread -0.0191* -0.0161 -0.0286**
(0.0111) (0.0189) (0.0133)
Term spread 0.0061 0.0068* 0.0051
(0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0043)
Credit rating dummies Yes Yes Yes
Performance pricing Yes Yes Yes
Loan type Yes Yes Yes
Loan purpose Yes Yes Yes
Industry e¤ect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,267 2,267 2,267
Adjusted R2 0.332 0.334 0.331
Notes: The dependent variable is capital expenditure divided by lagged total assets. The results are obtained from IV
estimations. The instrument for hedging is a rms tax convexity. IR/FX hedging is the total amount of interest rate
and currency hedging scaled by assets. All variable denitions are reported in Appendix II. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors clustered at the rm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical signicance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
31
Table V. Robustness Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net IR/FX hedging -1.737***
(0.385)
IR/FX hedging -1.542*** -1.177*** -1.471*** -1.171***
(0.269) (0.394) (0.544) (0.372)
Firms previous loans -0.059* -0.073** -0.051** -0.070** -0.078**
(0.032) (0.033) (0.025) (0.031) (0.033)
Log asset -0.127* -0.139** -0.108* -0.157* -0.150**
(0.073) (0.064) (0.060) (0.093) (0.067)
Protability -0.520** -0.692** -0.401* -0.692** -0.559*
(0.227) (0.297) (0.218) (0.304) (0.306)
Tangibility -0.112 -0.137 -0.105 -0.142* -0.150*
(0.104) (0.091) (0.117) (0.081) (0.089)
Cash ow volatility 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003
(0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
M/B -0.103** -0.110*** -0.117** -0.125*** -0.142**
(0.046) (0.035) (0.050) (0.044) (0.056)
Leverage 0.302 0.383** 0.257 0.345* 0.327*
(0.196) (0.177) (0.173) (0.200) (0.183)
Z-score -0.124** -0.096** -0.126** -0.111**
(0.050) (0.043) (0.056) (0.050)
Distance-to-default -0.076***
(0.022)
Asset volatility 0.210*** 0.102 0.262** 0.225*** 0.212***
(0.042) (0.247) (0.119) (0.036) (0.038)
Log loan size -0.062 -0.056 -0.03 -0.063 -0.066
(0.044) (0.039) (0.027) (0.053) (0.053)
Log maturity (in days) 0.144 0.154 0.118 0.165 0.194
(0.098) (0.101) (0.100) (0.124) (0.166)
Credit spread 0.377** 0.384** 0.450** 0.374* 0.381*
(0.177) (0.183) (0.184) (0.218) (0.213)
Term spread -0.042 -0.075 -0.036 -0.043 -0.057
(0.031) (0.049) (0.049) (0.034) (0.040)
Credit rating dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Performance pricing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry e¤ect Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Firm e¤ect No No Yes No No
Observations 2211 2464 2038 2464 1860
Adjusted R2 0.554 0.56 0.522 0.37 0.576
Notes: The dependent variable is log of loan spread. In columns (1) and (2), the estimations are via OLS. Column
(3) is a rm-xed e¤ect estimation. Column (4) is a median regression with pseudo-R2 reported. Column (5) is the
deal-level OLS regression. Net IR/FX hedging is net interest rate and net currency hedging scaled by assets. IR/FX
hedging is the total amount of interest rate and currency hedging scaled by assets. All variable denitions are reported
in Appendix II. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the rm level are reported in parentheses. *,
**, and *** represent statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table VI. Hedging and the Cost of Debt
(1) (2) (3)
IR/FX hedging -1.920*** -1.960*** -1.706***
(0.305) (0.324) (0.264)
IR/FX hedging  Z-score 0.476***
(0.152)
IR/FX hedging  M/B -0.394***
(0.110)
Firms previous loans -0.044* -0.042* -0.040**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.017)
Log asset -0.127 -0.131** -0.124
(0.078) (0.060) (0.086)
Protability -0.493 -0.532 -0.512**
(0.321) (0.397) (0.246)
Tangibility -0.106** -0.116* -0.111*
(0.048) (0.066) (0.062)
Cash ow volatility 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.015) (0.003) (0.009)
M/B -0.098*** -0.101*** -0.064*
(0.029) (0.026) (0.038)
Leverage 0.348** 0.250 0.318
(0.161) (0.153) (0.249)
Z-score -0.090*** -0.090** -0.096***
(0.031) (0.043) (0.026)
Asset volatility 0.329*** 0.322*** 0.355***
(0.082) (0.072) (0.076)
Log loan size -0.053 -0.061* -0.060*
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
Log maturity (in days) 0.135 0.150* 0.162
(0.120) (0.079) (0.198)
Credit spread 0.379 0.332 0.428**
(0.243) (0.256) (0.215)
Term spread -0.035 -0.04 -0.036
(0.029) (0.028) (0.027)
Credit rating dummies Yes Yes Yes
Performance pricing Yes Yes Yes
Loan type Yes Yes Yes
Loan purpose Yes Yes Yes
Industry e¤ect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,455 1,455 1,455
Adjusted R2 0.484 0.486 0.489
Notes: The dependent variable is log of cost of debt (Cooper and Davydenko (2007)). The results are obtained from IV
estimations. The instrument for hedging is a rms tax convexity. IR/FX hedging is the total amount of interest rate
and currency hedging scaled by assets. All variable denitions are reported in Appendix II. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors clustered at the rm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical signicance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
33
